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Abstract  
 
This paper shows that many structural remedies in a sample of European 
merger cases result in market structures which would probably not be cleared 
by the Competition Authority (CA) if they were the result of merger (rather 
than remedy).  This is explained by the fact that the CA’s objective through 
remedy is to restore pre-merger competition, but markets are often highly 
concentrated even before merger.  If so, the CA must often choose between 
clearing an ‘uncompetitive’ merger, or applying an unsatisfactory remedy.  
Here, the CA appears reluctant to intervene against coordinated effects, if 
doing so enhances a leader’s dominance.   
 
JEL Classification Codes: L13, L41 
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1 Introduction 
When a competition authority (CA) anticipates that a proposed merger will 
lead to competitive harm, it is required to intervene, either by prohibiting the 
merger outright or, more commonly, requiring a merger remedy. Typically 
remedies are structural, requiring the divestment of certain assets 1 . This 
paper contributes to a growing literature, devoted to assessing ex-post the 
effectiveness of structural remedies.   
 
The existing economic and legal literature is summarised by Davies & Lyons 
(2007, section 2.1).  Widely discussed criteria for defining a ‘good’ remedy 
include: restoration of competition, minimisation of administrative costs, 
minimising the loss of merger-induced efficiencies, and efficient reallocation of 
divested assets (Lévêque, 2001; Balto, 2001).  To date, the two most 
comprehensive empirical studies are by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, 
1999) and the European Commission (EC, 2005): both reviews evaluated 
efficacy largely in terms of the subsequent viability of the divested assets2.  
 
This paper differs from the FTC and EC studies.  Rather than focussing, as 
they do, on the viability of divested assets, it examines the implied structures 
of markets, post-remedy.  For a sample of 62 European Commission (EC) 
merger remedy cases, we identify the impact of divestiture remedies on 
                                                 
1 The EC’s Notice on Remedies states a preference for remedies involving divestiture of a 
stand-alone business (Monti, 2003), and its evaluation study (2005) reveals that most 
remedies are indeed structural: 83 of the 96 remedies in its sample.  
2 The FTC reports that only 75% of divestitures in its sample were successful, in the sense 
that the acquirer was still in the market one year after, and was independent from the seller. 
The EC reports a higher success rate using a similar criterion (94% still in business three to 
five years later), but employing a wider criterion, it assessed only 57% of remedies as 
successful.  See Papandropoulos and Tajana (2006) and Lévêque (2007) for discussion of 
the EC study, and Baer and Redcay (2003) on the FTC study.  
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market structure. Very often, the remedy returns the market to exactly its pre-
merger structure.  In this sense, the remedy succeeds in ‘restoring 
competition’, which is the stated objective of most CAs.   
 
These post-remedy structures are then compared with the counterfactual 
structures had the merger been cleared without remedies.  We also conduct 
an analogous comparison for a set of markets in which the merger was 
cleared without remedy: in that case, comparing the post-merger structure 
with what it would have been had remedies restored structure to its pre-
merger status quo.  In order to evaluate these comparisons, we employ a 
previously estimated model (Davies et al., 2010) which was used to explain 
the Commission’s initial merger decisions on whether or not to intervene, and, 
if so, under which theory of harm.   
 
We find that nearly half of post-remedy market structures would have been 
intervened had they arisen as a result of merger.  In almost all cases, this is 
because the pre-merger structure was already highly concentrated, and this 
constrained the EC’s ability to achieve, by remedy, a new structure free of 
competitive concern.  We also find a sub-set where the EC is confronted by a 
difficult choice between single and collective dominance3.  We find that the EC 
reveals a systematic preference: it is more likely to accept a merger which 
creates a larger #2 firm, in spite of an increased chance of collective 
dominance, if the alternative by remedy is a larger singly dominant #1 firm. 
 
                                                 
3 Henceforward we employ single and collective dominance – the prevailing EC terminology 
up to 2004 – as synonyms for unilateral and coordinated effects respectively. 
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2  A Sample of EC Mergers and Structural Remedies 
The sample comprises 62 EU mergers over the period 1990-mid 2004 (i.e. up 
to the revision of the EC Merger Regulation), in which there is strong textual 
evidence in its decision report that the Commission seriously considered 
collective dominance as a potential outcome.  Thus the sample is deliberately 
not random, but includes all mergers where single and collective dominance 
were considered in depth and simultaneously within the same merger.  This is 
ideal, given our present interest in identifying how the Commission chooses 
between theories of harm. 
 
Most of these mergers are multi-market, with the individual market defined 
typically at the Member State level, and most also involve a number of 
different product markets. In total they account for 386 different markets.  
Remedies are rarely required in all markets covered by the same merger 
(except in the extreme case of outright prohibition), and it is common to find 
non-interventions and interventions, and different types of intervention for 
different markets, in the same merger.  In total, the Commission actually 
intervened in only 118 markets (44 for collective dominance and 74 for single 
dominance); in the remaining 268, no intervention was deemed necessary.  
 
Structural remedies were applied in 112 markets4. The first part of Table 1 
(POST-MERGER, full sample) shows the descriptive statistics on the 
concentration of these markets, and the market shares and rank of the 
merged firms.  This part of the Table relates to the counterfactual: what would 
                                                 
4 Behavioural remedies were agreed in the other six intervened markets and these are not 
analysed here.   
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supplemented with information from other sources, including company reports 
and business news websites.    
 
In the event, we were unable to quantify the scale of the divested assets in 28 
of the markets – as this was this unclear from the EC’s own decision report, 
and our own intensive searches failed to unearth reliable estimates.  
Moreover, amongst the 84 markets where scale could be identified, there are 
a further 18 where our searches were unable to identify the purchaser of the 
assets.  This leaves a reduced sample of 66 markets for which we have the 
required information on divestments. 
 
The second part of Table 1 repeats the same summary statistics as above for 
this reduced sample, still related to the hypothetical post-merger outcomes.  
As can be seen, the sample statistics are very similar to those for the full 
sample. 
 
The third part of the Table, relates to the post-remedy outcomes6 for this 
reduced sample.  On average, divestment reduces CR2 by 10 points, and the 
share of the merged firm by 17 points – typically, the scale of divestment is by 
no means trivial, and in 12 cases this prevents the merged firm from 
becoming #1.    
 
 
 
                                                 
6 Post-remedy shares are computed by subtracting the shares of divested assets from the 
above calculated post-merger shares. 
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follows that structure post-remedy will be very similar to pre-merger structure 
because the ‘exiting’ merger party is simply replaced by an entrant.  Indeed, in 
the special case, where the scale of divested assets is identical to the size of 
one of the merging parties and the purchaser is an entrant, the immediate 
effect of the transfer is to render the two market structures identical9:  
 
FINDING 1b.  The most common outcome of divestment remedies (in 
44/66=67% of the markets for which we have sufficient information) is to 
return the market exactly to its pre-merger structure.   
 
If we are prepared to interpret an unchanged size distribution as evidence of 
unchanged competition, these findings suggest that the EC practices its 
remedy policy in a way which is consistent with the broad objective as set out 
in its published guidelines: 
 
“Where a concentration raises competition concerns…, the 
parties may seek to modify the concentration in order to resolve 
the competition concerns”10 
 
The US guidelines also include a similar objective:  
“Although the remedy should always be sufficient to redress the 
antitrust violation, the purpose of a remedy is not to enhance 
premerger competition but to restore it.”11 12 
 
                                                                                                                                            
other products markets within the same broad product category in the same, or other, 
countries.  
9 By ‘immediate’ we refer to only the effect of the transfer in ownership of divested assets. 
This abstracts, of course, from any subsequent developments post-remedy, such as 
rationalisation by the buyer, or contraction due to non-viability.  We have no information on 
these for the current sample, but return to this general issue at the end of section 4. 
10 “Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 
and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004” (2008, para.5), Retrieved July 8, 2010, 
from http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2008:267:0001:0027:EN:PDF  
11US DoJ, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies. Retrieved July 8, 2010, from 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/205108.pdf, p.4.  
12 The UK Competition Commission’s guidelines (2008, p.15) also express a similar objective.     
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To investigate the possibility of selection bias in these two findings, we return 
to the 46 markets excluded from the reduced sample because the scale of 
divestment and/or identity of purchaser are unknown.  We find no significant 
difference between them and the included markets in terms of post-merger 
mean concentration.  However, there is a significant difference in the EC’s 
declared theory of harm: single dominance was cited for 89% of the excluded 
markets, as opposed to 65% of the included markets.  There is no obvious a 
priori explanation for this, but we return to the implications in the final section.   
 
This means that we should not rule out the possibility of a selection bias in the 
magnitudes of the two sample percentages in Findings 1a and 1b 13 .  
However, for present purposes, the exact magnitudes are relatively 
unimportant, since all we require is the conclusion that it is neither uncommon, 
nor unexpected, that merger remedies will restore a market to its pre-merger 
structure.  Corroboration that remedies typically do restore pre-merger 
structure is provided from a completely different EC sample by Davies and 
Lyons (2007, p.243).  They refer to this outcome as “prohibition within the 
market” since, even if the merger is not prohibited in all markets, such a 
remedy in a particular market implies a return to the pre-merger structure14.  
 
3.   Assessing market structures post-remedy  
Against this background, we now turn to two further questions.  It appears that 
remedies often restore the structure of the market to its pre-merger state, but 
                                                 
13  For example, this would occur if there was a difference between single and collective 
dominance cases in the EC’s tendency to exactly remove overlap.    
14 In principle, prohibition within the market need not return structure to its pre-merger state.  
As shown by Vergé (2009, pp.12-15), the remedy can reduce concentration if divested assets 
are sold to more than one purchaser, but, in all cases here, there was only a single buyer. 
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should this always necessarily be preferred to the structure which would result 
from simply clearing the merger, and, how does EC choose between the two?  
 
3(i) Methodology for assessing market structures 
To answer these questions, we need some means of assessing the 
‘competitiveness’ of different market structures.  For this purpose, we return to 
the econometric model estimated by the authors in a previous paper (2010).  
The objective there was to identify the implicit model of market structure used 
by the European Commission, when deciding whether mergers are likely to 
have coordinated effects15.  It was estimated on the same sample of 62 
mergers covering 386 markets as described above, with the individual market 
within each merger used as the unit of observation.   
 
The model draws explicitly on a reading of the EC’s own published merger 
guidelines, which explain that the likelihood of competitive harm depends 
upon: i) market shares and concentration levels (including asymmetries), 
and ii) a checklist of other market conditions (barriers to entry, absence of 
countervailing buyer power, price transparency and capacity). Davies et al. 
(2010) argue that the EC interprets this checklist as a series of necessary 
conditions which must be satisfied if it is to intervene.  This is confirmed by a 
detailed reading of the EC’s decision documents which reveal no cases where 
intervention occurs in spite of one or more checklist factors not being satisfied. 
This obviates the need to measure or proxy concepts such as price 
transparency or barriers to entry which are inherently unmeasurable in any 
                                                 
15 That paper builds on the sizeable empirical literature which attempts to explain CA merger 
decisions, including most recently: Bergman et al. (2005) for the EU, Coate (2005) and Coate 
and Ulrick (2006, 2009) for the US, and Bergman et al. (2009) comparing the EU and the US.  
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objective manner.  There are 154 markets for which the EC reports that no 
intervention was required because the checklist was not satisfied, and these 
are excluded from estimation.  In the remaining 232, with the checklist 
satisfied (in the eyes of the EC), the theory of harm (if any) then depends on 
the configuration of market shares.   
 
A multinomial logit model is estimated to predict the Commission's decision 
for each of the 232 markets in terms of market structure. Three outcomes are 
possible: Collective Dominance (CD), Single Dominance (SD) or Non-
Intervention (NI). The Commission’s reports always set out its reasons for 
intervention in terms of either collective or single dominance: as explained in 
section 2, it found CD and SD in 44 and 74 markets respectively, the 
remaining markets were not intervened.  Nearly all the markets would have 
had no more than two or (much less frequently) three major players16 post-
merger.  With only one exception, the Commission never identified collective 
dominance with a market of more than two major firms.  Therefore two simple 
measures of structure are used as explanatory variables, based solely on the 
prospective post-merger shares of the largest two firms (S1 and S2): SUM = 
S1+S2 and RATIO =S2/S1. SUM is a simple measure of concentration and 
RATIO is a measure of size asymmetry between them17.  
 
Table 3 reports the results: 81% of the model’s predictions are correct, and 
both SUM and RATIO are strongly significant at the 99% level for both SD and 
                                                 
16 For example, defining a ‘significant’ market share arbitrarily as no less than 15%, there 
would have been only 1 or 2 significant players post-merger in 79% of markets, and 3 major 
players in another 19%. 
17 Experiments showed that no other vector of market shares or concentration achieved a 
better fit than this parsimonious form.  
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CD.  Estimated coefficients have the expected signs, indicating that 
intervention is more likely in concentrated markets (higher SUM) and, for CD, 
in symmetric markets (high RATIO) but for SD in asymmetric markets (low 
RATIO).  
Table 3 Explaining EC Merger Decisions (Davies et al., 2010, Table 2) 
SD  
SUM 6.355*** (1.217) 
RATIO -6.188*** (1.284) 
Constant -1.4390** (0.605) 
CD  
SUM 10.052*** (2.080) 
RATIO 7.382*** (1.979) 
Constant -13.899*** (1.963) 
N 232 
Pseudo R 2  0.454 
Log-L -123.627
Wald Chi 2  110.99*** 
Correct predictions (%):  
ALL  81 
SD  81 
CD  83 
NI  80 
***Significantly different from 0 at 1% level, ** significantly different from 0 at 5% level. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Equations are estimated with observations clustered by 
merger. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 1 Predicted theories of harm as revealed in EC merger decisions  
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Figure 1 presents a graphical depiction of the results.  For any given (S1, S2) 
pair it shows the outcome with the highest predicted probability (recalling that 
this is conditional on the checklist of other factors having been satisfied.)  
 
3(ii) Assessing post-remedy structures  
Since this model achieves a high predictive power, we interpret it as a 
reasonably accurate representation of how the EC assesses prospective post-
merger market structures.  By now using it to assess the remedies, where 
imposed, we follow Motta’s suggestion (2004, p.268), that 18: 
“evaluation of merger remedies should follow the same twofold 
test used in merger analysis, that is the evaluation of unilateral 
effects and pro-collusive effects.  Remedies should be accepted, 
and the merger proposal cleared, only if both tests are satisfied.” 
 
We now refer to a structure (S1, S2 pair) as  
• ‘uncompetitive’ if it is located in the SD or CD regions, or 
• ‘competitive’, if otherwise in the NI region.   
                                                 
18  In the recent theoretical literature, Vergé (2009) also assesses the competitive efficiency of 
remedies by treating their outcome as if the result of a new merger. 
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The term ‘uncompetitive’ here is used largely for expositional convenience, 
and it is clearly very context-specific – an ‘uncompetitive’ market is one in 
which the structure would typically attract EC intervention if resulting from a 
merger – given that the other market characteristics such as entry barriers are 
also conducive to the exercise of market power.  This should not be taken to 
imply that market power can always simply be imputed from market shares, 
nor does it deny that the CA might often employ data on shares as proxies for 
underlying factors such as closeness of substitutes and the underlying causes 
of asymmetry.  It simply captures, fairly accurately, the implicit reduced form 
‘model’ that the EC reveals in its decision making.       
 
Consider first, Table 4, part (a), which  reports the results of applying this 
model to estimates of S1 and S2 in each of the 66 markets which were 
remedied, to predict ‘competitiveness’ under three scenarios.  In each case, it 
shows the outcome with the highest predicted probability according to the 
model.  REMEDY is based on the post-remedy market structure (assuming 
that the size of the divested asset remains unchanged following the transfer of 
ownership.)  MERGER is a counterfactual, based on the structure which 
would have resulted had the merger been cleared (assuming analogously that 
the market share of the merged entity would be the sum of the pre-merger 
shares of the merging parties.)  For comparative purposes the actual PRE-
MERGER structure is also computed.   
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The MERGER column confirms that, without remedies, 75% (=49/66) of 
markets would have been ‘uncompetitive’ following merger.  The REMEDY 
column reveals a more surprising result: 
 
FINDING 2 Nearly half (47%=31/66) of all divestment remedies result in 
‘uncompetitive’ structures, i.e. structures which the Commission would 
have sought to remedy (according to our model) had they been the result 
of a merger.  
 
At least part of the explanation for this is revealed in the PRE-MERGER 
column: 
 
FINDING 3 Even before merger, 39%(=26/66) of these markets involved 
‘uncompetitive’ market structures.   
 
The implication of Findings 2 and 3 taken together is as follows.  Many 
markets are ‘uncompetitive’ pre-merger, and typically remedies can at most 
only return the market to that pre-merger structure.  Therefore, remedies will 
often result in a structure which remains ‘uncompetitive’ – in the sense that 
the EC would typically require a remedy, had it been the result of a merger.  
As such, Motta’s suggestion, quoted earlier, that remedies should be 
accepted only if they result in a market free of competitive concerns, may be 
setting an unrealistic target in some cases (those mergers where no feasible 
remedy could lead to a market structure free of concern.)      
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Table 4: Market structures classified according to Figure 1 
 PRE-
MERGER 
MERGER REMEDY 
(a) Remedied Markets 
(66) 
   
Uncompetitive 26 49 31 
Competitive 40 17 35 
  
(b) Cleared markets 
(89) 
   
Uncompetitive 13 16 - 
Competitive 76 73 - 
 
 
3(iii) Assessing pre-merger structures in non-intervened markets  
 
Part (b) of the Table examines the opposite scenario by considering those 
sample markets where the EC chose not to intervene – are some of these 
markets cleared in spite of an implied ‘uncompetitive’ merger, because there 
was no practicable possibility of removing the problem by remedy?   
There are 114 sample markets in which the EC chose not to intervene.  We 
have sufficient data on the pre-merger values of S1 and S2 for 8919.  In the 
majority of these (73), the clearance is uncontentious because the markets 
were ‘competitive’ even following the merger, but in 16 others the merger 
resulted in an ‘uncompetitive’ structure, i.e. one in which an intervention would 
have been expected (according to the model.)  Significantly, in 13 of these, 
the pre-merger structure was also uncompetitive, and this certainly suggests 
the opposite scenario to the above - sometimes the EC prefers not to 
intervene in an uncompetitive merger because there is no feasible remedy 
which can lead to a competitive structure.  
                                                 
19 In the 25 others, the decision report records only the combined post-merger share of the 
merged firm.  
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4.  Choosing Between Anticompetitive Structures 
Given then that there will be cases where the Commission is faced by a  
choice between clearing and remedying mergers, where neither option will 
lead to a market structure free of competition doubts, we now explore the 
apparent basis on which it makes that choice in this sample. 
 
In particular, we are interested in the possibility that this may sometimes 
involve a choice between alternative theories of harm.  This responds to a 
suggestion by Motta et al. (2003) that, because the EC typically strives to 
ensure that remedies secure a viable competitor to the merged firm (in order 
to avoid single dominance), it might have sometimes so enhanced symmetry 
in market shares as to have increased the chance of collective dominance 
post-remedy.  
 
This tension is also implicit in Compte et al.’s (2002) critique of the EC 
decision in the Nestle/Perrier merger of 1992.  Applying a theoretical model of 
competition between asymmetrically capacity-constrained oligopolists to that 
case, they argue that the EC’s chosen remedy, divesting some assets to a 
major rival, significantly increased the chances of coordinated effects, 
precisely because it reduced asymmetry.  Allowing the merger without remedy 
would have been preferable.   
 
To identify how commonly such a choice may occur in the present sample, 
Table 5 now focuses on a sub-set of the sample markets: those in which 
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structure is ‘uncompetitive’, both pre- and post-merger.  Here, we employ the 
pre-merger structure as indicative of the scope for practicable remedies. This 
can be thought of as an ‘upper bound’20- the maximum that might be achieved 
by remedy – and recalling that remedies do typically return the market to this 
upper bound (Finding 1(b)).  The Table also now distinguishes between single 
and collective dominance (SD and CD respectively).   
 
Table 5: Markets which are ‘uncompetitive’ both pre- and post-merger 
 
  MERGER 
 SD CD 
 
 
PRE-MERGER 
Intervened markets (26) 
SD 13 1 
CD 6 6 
Cleared markets (12) 
SD 10 0 
CD 0 2 
 
In total, there are 38 such markets (25% of those for which we have the 
necessary data).  In 26 the EC chose to intervene, but in 12 it did not21.  
Reading down the columns, in 29 markets the mergers would have lead to 
SD, and in 9 to CD.  Consider first the 26 interventions: in some cases the 
choice was straightforward – notably the 13 in the (SD, SD) cell, in which the 
merger merely strengthened a leading firm’s single dominance, and 
intervention was the obvious choice.  More interesting are the 6 markets in the 
                                                 
20 A recent theoretical literature allows for a continuous distribution of potential divestments 
between no intervention and this upper bound (for example, Cosnita and Tropeano, 2009).  
However, our above findings suggest that interior choices between the two are rare for the EC.  
21 The numbers in Table 5 relate to those in Table 4 as follows.  The total of 38 (Table 5) are 
the 39 uncompetitive pre-merger cases (Table 4), excluding one in which the merger 
rendered the market competitive.  The 26 intervened markets (Table 5) is a sub-set of the 31 
cases where the remedy resulted in an ‘uncompetitive’ structure (Table 4), excluding those 
where the remedy did not fully return the market to its pre-merger structure.  The 12 cleared 
markets (Table 5) are a sub-set of the 16 cleared in spite of an ‘uncompetitive’ post-merger 
structure (Table 4), excluding 4 in which the pre-merger position was not uncompetitive. 
Arguably, these 4 may be ‘mistakes’ by the Commission in that an anti-competitive merger 
could have been effectively remedied by a return to the status quo. 
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(CD, SD) cell – here, by intervening, the Commission revealed a preference 
for a pre-market structure of CD to a post-merger structure of SD.  There was 
only 1 intervention case where the EC revealed the reverse preference (SD 
over CD). 
 
Amongst the 12 non-intervened markets, the most frequent choice (10) again 
involved structures implying single dominance both before and after merger, 
but here the Commission preferred to clear the mergers.  In these cases, 
however, there is a different explanation.  In all 10, the merger increased the 
market share of the #2 firm, while leaving the dominant firm’s share 
unchanged.  Under the EC Merger Regulation operative over this time period, 
the only possible grounds for intervention in such cases would be to invoke a 
collective dominance theory of harm.  The fact that it chose not to implies that, 
if anything, it viewed the merger as pro-competitive by strengthening a #2 
firm, competing with a dominant #1 firm.   
 
In order to examine this role of firm rank more formally and widely, we now 
return to the econometric model in section 3(i), as estimated on the original 
full sample of 232 markets. Recall that there  S1 and S2 are the shares of the 
two largest firms in the market post-merger, regardless of identity, i.e. the 
merged firm may be #1 or #2.  Here, to explore the possibility that rank of the 
merged firm may influence the decision, we re-estimate the model 
separately22 , distinguishing whether the merged firm was #1 or #2 post-
merger. Where #1, as before, the EC can choose between NI, SD and CD, 
                                                 
22 Since this estimation does not require quantitative information on the pre-merger market 
shares, it can be estimated for the full original sample size of 232 markets.   
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Table 6: Re-estimation of the model, distinguishing rank of merged firm 
 I II 
Sample ME = #1 ME = #2 
N 176 56 
SD   
SUM 12.671*** (2.760)  
RATIO -7.747*** (2.544)  
Constant -3.679*** (0.934)  
CD   
SUM 13.455*** (3.202) 4.768*** (1.374) 
RATIO 7.230*** (2.658) 3.217*** (0.959) 
Constant -15.542*** (3.092) -6.775*** (1.407) 
Pseudo R 2  0.582 0.302 
Log-L -70.634 -17.238 
Wald Chi 2  44.18*** 26.21*** 
Correct predictions (%):   
ALL  85 91 
SD 91 - 
CD  94 83 
NI  78 92 
***Significantly different from 0 at 1% level, ** significantly different from 0 at 5% level. 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Equations are estimated with observations clustered by 
merger. 
 
Finding 4 thus offers no support for the hypothesis that the Commission might 
sometimes have used CD, under the old ECMR, to justify its intervention 
where a merger would have led to a lessening of competition without 
coordinated behaviour, but where it could not be prevented on SD grounds24.  
Rather, the reverse is true, and this raises the contrary question of why the 
EC was less likely to intervene against CD when the merger did not involve 
the market leader.   
 
                                                 
24 Motta (2004, pp.272-3.) cites the EC prohibition of the Airtours/First Choice merger (M.1524) 
(subsequently overturned by the appeals court) as a possible example of this. 
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Figure 2: Revised areas of harm, taking account of rank 
 
We believe that the answer lies in the likely impact of any structural remedy in 
these circumstances.  Clearly, any remedy imposed on a #2 firm does not 
reduce the size of the leader, but it does reduce market share symmetry.  In 
terms of Figure 2, the remedy has the effect of moving market structure in a 
westerly direction - reducing the likelihood of collective dominance, but 
increasing the probability of single dominance.  One interpretation of the 
preference not to remedy is that, on balance, the EC views a more sizeable 
#2 firm as a greater constraint on an otherwise singly dominant firm.    
 
Furthermore this tolerance of possible collective dominance would be 
reinforced if the Commission had any doubt about the medium-term viability of 
the divested assets.  Such doubts can not be discounted, given the finding of 
the EC’s own remedy study (2005, pp.129-30), that the market share of 
divested businesses decreased in 44% of its sample 3-5 years after remedy 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
So
Sm
e
 
CD 
CD 
SD 
NI 
 25
(increasing in only 18% of cases).  In contrast, for businesses retained by the 
merged entity, market share increased in 47% of cases (decreasing in only 
33%) over the same period of time.  This implies that any remedy returning a 
market to a pre-merger position close to SD might risk increased future single 
dominance as the market share of the divested asset declines.           
 
5. Implications and Qualifications 
At the heart of this paper is a simple idea.  When deciding remedies for 
markets in which a merger leads to competition concerns, CAs typically set 
their objective as restoring competition to its pre-merger level.  However, this 
raises a question which, although fairly obvious, is rarely discussed in either 
the policy or academic previous literatures: ‘how should the CA proceed 
where the pre-merger market is already not free of competition concerns?’  
Where this is the case, the CA would be faced with an awkward choice 
between two potentially undesirable states – an ‘uncompetitive’ merger or 
returning a market to an ‘uncompetitive’ pre-merger state.   
 
Using a sample of EC structural remedies, we derive four main findings.  First, 
structural remedies invariably remove the increment in market share of the 
merging parties, and this usually returns the structure of the market to its pre-
merger level.  If one is prepared to equate structure with the level of 
competition, the EC would therefore appear to typically achieve its stated 
objective.   
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Second, in nearly half of all remedy cases, the post-remedy structure is itself 
not consistent with competition, in the specific sense that the EC would have 
sought to remedy it, had it been the result of a merger.   
 
This can be largely explained by our third finding, namely that many of these 
markets are already ‘uncompetitive’ even before merger.  In such cases, the 
EC is indeed confronted with a choice between two ‘uncompetitive’ states.  A 
similar choice is also evident in another class of cases within the sample – 
those markets in which the EC chose not to intervene, preferring to clear a 
seemingly anticompetitive merger where the alternative would have been to 
restore an uncompetitive pre-merger structure.  The choice is sometimes 
between alternative theories of harm – single or collective dominance (i.e. 
unilateral or coordinated effects.)   
 
Our fourth finding is that, in this particular sample, the EC is less likely to 
intervene by imposing remedies to counteract collective dominance if, post-
merger, the merged entity would be the #2 ranked firm.  We suggest that this 
implies a greater tolerance of potential collective dominance where the 
alternative is to otherwise accept increased potential single dominance. 
 
Finally, we assess how sensitive these findings might be to two key features 
of our methodology: (i) sample selection and (ii) the empirical model employed 
to define uncompetitive market structures. 
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Sample selection 
As stressed earlier, this sample is definitely not random. Rather, it was 
constructed deliberately so as to include all EC mergers where single and 
collective dominance were considered in depth and simultaneously by the EC.   
Moreover, even within this sample, there is an implicit selection bias due to 
the unavoidable omission of markets for which we did not have full information 
on the nature of the remedies.  As described in section 2, nearly all of these 
omitted cases involved remedies designed to counteract single dominance.  
This suggests that the useable sample under-represents the frequency with 
which the EC chooses single dominance as its theory of harm.  However, this 
can not undermine our conclusion that the EC has an apparent preference for 
the possibility of collective over single dominance – if anything, it reinforces 
the conclusion.  
 
More generally, our sample necessarily excludes another class of mergers – 
those considered by the parties, but never actually proposed because the 
parties anticipated that they would pose the EC precisely the awkward choice 
just described.  We can not rule out such a deterrence effect, but it is not 
obvious how this would systematically bias results towards one theory of harm 
over another. 
 
Finally, one other distinguishing feature of this sample is the time period, 
1990-2004, which covers the period up until the EC revised its Merger 
Regulation.  Again, this was quite deliberate, and in order to avoid mixing two 
potentially significantly different regimes.  A main feature of the 2004 revision 
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was to introduce a ‘significant impediment to effective competition’ test, under 
which intervention remained possible on single dominance grounds, but in 
addition provided the Commission with an extra tool - intervention against 
unilateral effects even when the merged firm was not singly dominant and 
collective dominance (now re-titled coordinated effects (CE)) was considered 
unlikely.  This revision also allowed the EC to explicitly consider any evidence 
of merger efficiencies25.  
 
Davies et al. (2010, pp. 28-9) summarise the Commission's merger decisions 
in the years following revision.  Interventions on the grounds of CE became 
extremely rare26.  Without further analysis, it is unclear what were the reasons 
for this, but it is, at least superficially, consistent with our above finding that 
the Commission tended to be more tolerant of possible collective dominance 
than of enhanced single dominance in the years prior to 2004. 
 
 
Defining uncompetitive structures 
Our methodology rests on the distinction between ‘uncompetitive’ and 
‘competitive’ market structures, based on the model from our previous paper 
which explains the EC’s initial merger decisions in terms of market structure.  
This has the virtue of drawing on the EC’s own revealed behaviour when it 
assesses mergers, and it ensures internal consistency between merger 
assessment and remedy decisions. 
                                                 
25  Before 2004, it is unclear to what extent efficiency gains were recognised and they were 
never accepted (see Motta, 2004, pp. 274-5).     
26 There were 19 mergers (covering 334 markets) in which there were interventions and the 
decision documents reveal that collective dominance was seriously considered. In only 4 of 
these markets did the Commission actually intervene on the grounds of coordinated effects. 
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Superficially, this potentially exposes us to the conventional criticism that the 
level of competition should not be simply equated to market structure.  
However, a key assumption of our model, based on the EC’s guidelines, is 
that market shares and concentration only ‘matter’ if the EC is convinced that 
the other characteristics of the market (such as high entry barriers, absence of 
buyer power etc.) are consistent with the exercise of market power.  As 
explained in section 3(i), all markets in the sample satisfy these necessary 
conditions and ‘uncompetitive’, as we have defined it, entails not just high 
concentration, but also the existence of entry barriers, absence of buyer 
power and transparent prices (in the case of coordinated effects).  More 
pragmatically, the model achieves a high success rate in explaining the 
Commission’s merger decisions, and can be interpreted as a fair description 
of its underlying model – regardless of any limitations that model might have. 
 
Nevertheless, the fit is not perfect, and alternative interpretations of what 
constitutes an uncompetitive market are clearly possible.  Indeed, for the 
purpose of this study, we have abstracted from any assessment of the 
subsequent viability of divested assets, but, as already stressed in the 
previous assessments of the FTC and EC, this turns out to also be a key 
dimension of the post remedy evolution of market structure.   
 
Bearing in mind these qualifications, further work is clearly required – for other 
samples (for other jurisdictions and time periods) before claiming too much 
generality for our findings.  It seems very likely that some of our findings will 
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be robust: we would expect that very often remedies do restore the market to 
its pre-merger structure (given the stated objective of CA guidelines); and that 
those pre-merger structures will often themselves raise potential competition 
concerns – this is almost inevitable given that most mergers investigated in 
depth by CAs will tend to occur in markets which are already tightly 
oligopolistic.   
 
However, our results on the potential trade off between unilateral and 
coordinated effects, must be conditioned on the very specific feature of our 
particular sample.  This was selected precisely in order to focus on this issue.  
This has allowed us to confirm that some of the issues raised in the classic 
Nestle-Perrier merger and Compte et al.’s critique are not singular to this 
case, and are potentially replicated in other cases.  However, we would not 
necessarily expect the trade-off to be as frequent in more general random 
samples.   
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